What does feeling a sharp pain in one´s hand have in common with seeing a red apple on the table? Some say not much, apart from the fact that they are both conscious experiences. To see an object is to perceive an extramental reality--in this case, a red apple. To feel a pain, by contrast, is to undergo a conscious experience that doesn´t necessarily relate the subject to an objective reality. Perceptualists, however, dispute this. They say both experiences are forms of perception of an objective reality. Feeling a pain in one´s hand, according to this view, is perceiving an objective (physical) condition of one´s hand. Who is closer to truth? Because of such metaphysical issues, the subjectivity of pains combined with their clinical urgency raises methodological problems for pain scientists. How can a subjective phenomenon be studied objectively? What is the role of the first-person method (e.g., introspection) in science? Some suggest that the subjectivity of pains (and of conscious experiences in general) is due to their metaphysical irreducibility to purely physical processes in the nervous system. Can this be true? The study of pain and its puzzles offers opportunities for understanding such larger issues as the place of consciousness in the natural order and the methodology of psychological research. In this book, leading philosophers and scientists offer a wide range of views on how to conceptualize and study pain. The essays include discussions of perceptual and representationalist accounts of pain; the affective-motivational dimension of pain; whether animals feel pain, and how this question can be investigated; how social pain relates to physical pain; whether first-person methods of gathering data can be integrated with standard third-person methods; and other methodological and theoretical issues in the science and philosophy of pain.
1 Introduction: A Critical and Quasi-Historical Essay on Theories of Pain Murat Aydede 1 2 The Epistemology of Pain Fred Dretske 59 3 Ow! The Paradox of Pain Christopher S. Hill 75 4 Another Look at Representationalism about Pain Michael Tye 99 Peer Commentary on Michael Tye 121 5 The Main Difficulty with Pain Murat Aydede 123 6 Bodily Sensations as an Obstacle for Representationism Ned Block 137 7 Michael Tye on Pain and Representational Content Barry Maund 143 8 In a State of Pain Paul Noordhof 151 9 In Defense of Representation: Reply to Commentaries Michael Tye 163 10 Painfulness Is Not a Quale Austen Clark 177 11 An Indirectly Realistic, Representational Account of Pain(ed) Perception Moreland Perkins 199 12 Categorizing Pain Don Gustafson 219 13 The Experimental Use of Introspection in the Scientific Study of Pain and Its Integration with Third-Person Methodologies: The Experiential-Phenomenological Approach Donald D. Price and Murat Aydede 243 Peer Commentary on Donald D. Price and Murat Aydede 275 14 Introspections without Introspeculations Shaun Gallagher and Morten Overgaard 277 15 Sensations and Methodology Robert D´Amico 291 16 Pain: Making the Private Experience Public Robert C. Coghill 299 17 The Problems of Pain Eddy Nahmias 307 18 Introspection and Unrevisability: Reply to Commentaries Murat Aydede and Donald D. Price 315 19 Closing the Gap on Pain: Mechanism, Theory, and Fit Thomas W. Polger and Kenneth J. Sufka 325 20 Deciphering Animal Pain Colin Allen, Perry N. Fuchs, Adam Shriver and Hilary D. Wilson 351 21 On the Neuro-Evolutionary Nature of Social Pain, Support, and Empathy Jaak Panksepp 367